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THE DEATH PENALTY, RETRIBUTION AND PENAL POLICY
JACK P. GIBBS*
No special training in psychology is required to
infer that Supreme Court Justices have agonized a
great deal over the death penalty in recent years.
They are badly split on the issue, and it would be
difficult to exaggerate the importance of the ra-
tionale that some of the Justices have offered for
not rejecting capital punishment as unconstitu-
tional.1 The rationale is not a belief in the deterrent
efficacy of capital punishment. To the contrary,
there is appreciable consensus among the Justices
that evidence of deterrence is far too inconclusive
to justify the death penalty. Yet, some of the
Justices are willing to entertain a distinctly differ-
ent argument-that retribution is a sufficient jus-
tification for legal executions-and the retributive
doctrine is currently receiving support from nu-
merous prominent scholars.2
RESURRECTION WITHOUT A CORPSE
Although the seeming resurrection of the retri-
butive doctrine at the highest judicial level may
appear to be the ultimate manifestation of the
national clamor for "law and order," that interpre-
tation is a gross oversimplification. For one thing,
a resurrection requires a corpse, and the retributive
doctrine was never truly buried in the cemetery of
ideas. To be sure, a host of critics have condemned
retribution as barbaric, thereby creating the
impression that the doctrine is an anachronism.
3
That is all the more the case because prominent
critics of the retributive doctrine have been truly
educated individuals. Hence, the tacit suggestion
is that the doctrine was invented and is now per-
petuated by "rednecks." Yet two great names in
the history of philosophy, Hegel and Kant, were
uncompromising retributivists.4 For that matter,
* Professor of Sociology, Vanderbilt University.
'See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plu-
rality and concurring opinions); Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972).
2 See, e.g., G. NEWMAN, THE PUNISHMENT RESPONSE
(1978); E. VAN DEN HAAG, PUNISHING CRIMINALS: CON-
CERNING A VERY OLD AND PAINFUL QUESTION (1975);
A. VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976).
3 Seegenerally K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISH-
MENT 190 (1968).
4 See G. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT (T. Knox
trans. 1952) and I. KAmr, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (W.
Hastie trans. 1887).
philosophers did not succumb to the anti-punitive
orientation that swept the social and behavioral.
sciences between 1938 and 1968,5 and thus one
finds the staunchest defenders of the retributive
doctrine among contemporary philosophers.6
Needless to say, whatever their moral or intellectual
defects may be, those philosophers are hardly red-
necks.
Returning to the main argument, if Supreme
Court Justices have come to a reconsideration of
retribution, the impetus was not their sensitivity to
public opinion but, rather, their doubts about
deterrence and recognition that the idea of reha-
bilitating criminals has fallen into disrepute. To be
sure, even now there is no truly conclusive evidence
that rehabilitation programs in criminal correc-
tions have failed to check recidivism, but those who
demand conclusive evidence before reshaping
penal policy may well wait forever. In any case,
those who have marshalled the evidence-such as
Kassebaum and Lipton-are not all retributivists
7
Perhaps the rehabilitation programs were
doomed to fail because of limited financial support
and the custodial context in which many of those
programs were implemented. Be that as it may, the
Supreme Court cannot direct revenues into reha-
bilitation programs or eliminate prisons with a
view to furthering rehabilitative programs.
ALTERNATIVES TO RETRIBUTION
As previously suggested, the retributive doctrine
is now being revitalized not only because its chief
contender-rehabilitation-no longer commands
a strong following, but also because of the uncon-
vincing evidence generated by deterrence research.
5 Andenaes, General Prevention Revisited: Research and Pol-
icy Implications, 66J. CRIM. L. & C. 338 (1975); Johnston,
Punishment of Hwnan Behavior, 27 AM. PSYCH. 1033 (1972);
Singer, Psychological Studies of Punishment, 58 CALIF. L.
REV. 405 (1970).6 See H. Fingarette, Punishment and Suffering, Presi-
dential Address, Fifty-first Annual Pacific Meeting of the
American Philosophical Association (March, 1977).7 G. KASSEBAUM, D. WARD, & D. WILNER, PRISON
TREATMENr AND PAROLE SURVIVAL: AN EMPIRICAL
ASSESSMENI (1971); D. LIPTON, R. MARTrINSON, & J.
WILKS, THE EFFEarIVENESS OF CORRECTIONAL
TREArMEN : A SURVEY OF TREATMENT EVALUATION
SrUDIES (1975).
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The evidence concerning the deterrence efficacy of
the death penalty is particularly unconvincing,"
and hence it is largely by itn elimination of con-
tenders that retribution has come to be revitalized. 9
In that connection, human beings have not been
imaginative when it comes to a rationale for penal
policy. As already indicated, there are only three
principal contending doctrines (retribution, deter-
rence and rehabilitation) and that limited uumber
is conducive to a cyclical trend in penal policy.'
0
The trend can be broken, not by an assessment of
one of the principal contending doctrines, as when
one sets out to refute the deterrence doctrine; but
rather by the creation of new doctrines, or simply
new strategies in crime prevention. The only can-
didates on the horizon are incapacitation and "be-
havior modification."
Incapacitation
It is most unlikely that Americans are willing to
bear the cost of preventing crimes by incapacitat-
ing potential recidivists. Moreover, while car
thieves cannot practice their craft in prison, all
manner of crimes can and do occur in prison.
Indeed, only execution incapacitates absolutely
(regardless of the type of crime); but incapacitation
is a dubious rationale for the death penalty, for
there is no compelling evidence that the execution
of all convicted murderers would reduce the mur-
der rate appreciably. Indeed, the repetitive rate for
murderers appears to be very low." Hence it could
be that the murder rate would be reduced appre-
ciably only by the prevention of first offenses. So,
paradoxically, while the death penalty incapaci-
" See Zeizel, The Deterrent Effect of the Death Penalty: Facts
v. Faith,. 1076 Stp. Cr. REV. 317.
' Some scholars are evidently now willing to entertain
retribution only because they view it as the "best of a
bad lot." L. Wilkins, in A. VON HIRSCH, supra note 2, at
177-79. is remarkably candid in expressing that rationale.
"0 Of course, one could add a fourth doctrine-social
defense-but even after elaborate attempts to state the
doctrine it remains a hodge-podge. See M. ANCEL., SO-
CIAL. D.FENCE: A MODERN APPROACH TO CRIMINAL
PROBLEIMS (1965). The social defense doctrine would be
distinctive and coherent only if it were limited to the
prevention of crime through incapacitation, but that is
clearly not the case.
" See, e.g., Waldo, The 'Crminality Level' of Incarcerated
Murderers and Non-Murderers, 61 J. CRIm. L.C. & P.S. 60
(1970). However, figures pertaining to the repetition of
murder are limited to official statistics (re-arrest and re-
conviction) that do not clearly distinguish first-degree
murder from criminal homicide in general. Hence, some
doubts about the seemingly low repetitive rate for murder
must be entertained.
tates absolutely, its effect on the crime rate through
incapacitation may be inconsequential.
Nonetheless, considerable significance attaches
to the fact that the death penalty is the only
absolutely effective means of realizing incapacita-
tion. Yet, with seemingly endless appeals of death
penalty sentences, executions are perhaps even
more costly than life imprisonment t 2 In any case,
a penal policy based on incapacitation is bound to
be incomplete, for it would pertain only to felonies.
No one is likely to advocate the prevention of
misdemeanors through incarceration or executions.
Legislators and laymen simply do not perceive
misdemeanors as serious offenses; and, if realists,
they recognize that the incapacitation of misde-
meanants would be extremely costly.
Another strategy
An assessment of the other prospective strategy
in crime prevention-behavior modification-is
difficult because it is so new that an assessment
cannot rise above speculation.1 3 While the princi-
ples and techniques of operant conditioning or
aversive conditioning are distinct from traditional
rehabilitative programs in criminal corrections
(e.g., vocational training, counseling), essentially
the same doubts as to feasibility can be raised. 4
Briefly, it is difficult to imagine an inexpensive but
effective behavioral modification program. This is
largely because behavioral modification programs
are likely to require professional personnel, and
most of the techniques require the "treatment" of
one individual at a time rather than a mass appli-
cation.
While the punitive quality of a custodial context
may defeat rehabilitative efforts, that quality
would not necessarily preclude a successful behav-
ioral modification program, aversive conditioning
12 The author has been unable to find a study of the
relative monetary costs of "life imprisonment" and "ex-
ecution"; therefore, the statement is based on a general
observation by Justice Marshall in his concurrence in
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. at 357-58 (1972) (Marshall,
J., concurring).
13 It may well be that the effectiveness of behavioral
modification programs in criminal corrections cannot be
evaluated readily. In any case, there has been little
progress in that direction since publication of U.S. DEP'T
OF HEATI-H, EDUCATrION & WELFARE, DEVEI.OPMENT
AND LEGAL REGULATIONS OF COERCIVE BEHAVIOR
MODIFICA'rON TECHNIQUES, PUB. No. 73-9015 (1971).
"' Rehabilitation is often defined so broadly that "be-
havioral modification" is not different from rehabilita-




in particular. However, there are doubts as to
whether a conditioned response established in a
custodial context will actually prevent crimes out-
side that context. To illustrate, confronting an
incarcerated rapist with pictures of women who
have been physically assaulted and shocking him
would undoubtedly have some physiological or
neurological consequence, but whether it would
prevent his repetition of the crime on release is
another matter. Indeed, even if no rapist recidivates
after undergoing such "therapy," the same conse-
quence might ensue from shocking alone, which is
to say that it may be difficult to distinguish the
effects of aversive conditioning from specific deter-
rence. In any case, as long as the public demands
protection from convicted felons through incapa-
citation, no behavioral modification program is
likely to be accepted as a substitute for custody.
The point takes on special significance in recog-
nition of what is perhaps an exaggerated fear-
that murderers will kill again if released from
prison. So, even ignoring the constitutional and
ethical issues raised by behavioral modification
programs in criminal corrections,' 5 it is most un-
likely that any of those programs will be considered
as an alternative to the death penalty.
THE MERITS OF THE RETRIBUTIVE DOCTRINE
Only in the context of the foregoing issues and
problems can one appreciate the merits of the
retributive doctrine and see the reason for its "stay-
ing power." For one thing, whereas a custodial
context may thwart efforts at rehabilitation or
render behavioral modification ineffective, incar-
ceration can be construed as the "just desert" for
the violation of any criminal law and, hence, en-
tirely consistent with the retributive doctrine. The
general point is that the question of effectiveness
haunts all penal doctrines except the retributive. If
the business of criminal justice is to punish the
guilty because, and only because, they deserve it,
jurists or legislators need not be concerned with
problematical consequences of punishment.
Whereas the death penalty is the very contradic-
tion of rehabilitation and behavioral modification,
there is ample room for it in the doctrine of retri-
bution. Like it or not, no one is truly startled by
the argument that some crimes are so abominable
that the perpetrator deserves death. The incapaci-
15 See N. KrrrRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT
(1971); J. MrrFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT
(1973); J. MURPHY, PUNISHMENTrAND REHABILrTIION
(1973).
tation realized through the death penalty serves no
purpose if the deceased would not have repeated
the crime, but that poses no problem for the retri-
butive doctrine, according to which any legal pun-
ishment should be an end in itself.
Finally, given the emphasis in the retributive
doctrine on prosecuting individuals charged with
a crime as "morally responsible beings," retributiv-
ists need not be ambivalent when it comes to
granting the relevance of insanity pleas, an issue
that is likely to be intensified by the reintroduction
of the death penalty. The doctrine even provides a
firm basis for an unequivocal return to the classical
legal criterion of insanity. If the defendant knew
what he or she was doing in committing the act,
and knew it was wrong, the defendant was sane on
committing the act. That criterion can be applied
only through inferences, but it is hardly more
difficult to discern than judging whether or not an
individual acted in the grips of an irresistible im-
pulse or a mental disease. Indeed, the retributive
doctrine offers a distinct alternative to those who
are weary and wary of "psychiatric justice."
The retributive doctrine is not haunted by these
problems as much as contending doctrines largely
because it is not utilitarian. Since its goal is "doing
justice" rather than the prevention of crimes, it
makes no instrumental claims. Perhaps most im-
portant of all, in comparison with contenders, the
retributive doctrine is the least conducive to the
subversion of accepted principles ofjustice. In par-
ticular, the deterrence doctrine could encourage
the punishment of the innocent because, with a
view of promoting general deterrence, it is the pub-
lication of punishments and not the guilt of those
punished that is essential. That criticism of the
deterrence doctrine is not thwarted by the utilitar-
ians' reply that an innocent person cannot be legally
punished. The reply is a play on words, and it
would be a cruel joke for anyone who sits on death
row because of a judicial error. In any case, the
deterrence doctrine does not preclude the execution
of hostages to secure compliance with military law
in an occupied country, vicarious punishments (as
when the relatives of the alleged perpetrator of a
criminal act are executed), or false publicity of
punishments (to further general deterrence).
The alleged dangers of a rehabilitative penal
policy are more difficult to describe, largely be-
cause critics have introduced such a diverse range
of issues. Nonetheless, the criticisms reduce to two
major arguments: first, that advocates of rehabili-
tation call for a great deal of discretion both in
sentencing and selecting "treatment modes" for
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offenders; and, second, that such discretion is in-
herently dangerous. The debate hinges largely on
the second argument. That is the case because the
warrant for discretion-that it is benign and exer-
cised only to realize socially useful ends-is disput-
able. Indeed, so the criticism goes, there are con-
ceivable means to rehabilitation, such as psycho-
surgery,16 that cannot be justified by appealing to
social ends.
17
Unlike advocates of rehabilitation, retributivists
are under no burden to demonstrate that a retri-
butive reaction to crime is benign. No less impor-
tant, since the means-ends distinction is minimized
in the retributive doctrine, retributivists are less
open to the charge of allowing the ends to justify
the means.
QUESTIONS LEFT UNANSWERED BY THE
RETRIBUTIVE DOCTRINE
In assessing the retributive rationale for the
death penalty, Justice Marshall rejected in Furman
the argument that "retribution for its own sake" is
a defensible principle.' 8 Justice Marshall has, how-
ever, committed himself to a questionable strategy
in seeking to refute the retributive doctrine. As
suggested previously, the principle merit of the
retributive doctrine is that it makes no utilitarian
claims; accordingly, Justice Marshall's tacit de-
mand for a utilitarian rationale is contrary to the
retributive doctrine, and the demand does not
strike at the central defect of the doctrine. That
defect can be described succinctly. The doctrine
leaves so many questions about legal punishments
unanswered that it cannot serve as a basis for a
penal policy.
What is retribution?
Although an army of distinguished scholars has
written about the retributive doctrine, explicit and
ostensibly complete definitions of retribution are
simply alien to the literature. What appear to be
definitions have a curious metaphysical quality
about them. Consider, for example, Ernest van den
Haag's statement: "Retribution is to restore an
objective order rather than to satisfy a subjective
craving for revenge."19 The statement has only one
merit. It emphasizes the point that a retributive
16 See Shapiro, Legislating the Control of Behavior Control:
Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 237 (1974).
17 See generally J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSICE 3-4
(1971).
18 408 U.S. at 342-45 (1972) (Marshall,J., concurring).
19 E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 2, at 11.
punishment is not private or otherwise uncon-
trolled vengeance; rather it is punishment pre-
scribed and administered in accordance with law,
which is to say a legal punishment. The importance
of that point could not be exaggerated, though it
is seemingly lost on critics of retribution, who
dismiss the doctrine as a barbaric cry for venge-
ance. Nonetheless, van den Haag's statement
scarcely speaks to this question: Of all punishments
prescribed and administered in accordance with
law, what distinguishes retributive punishments?
Surely van den Haag does not presume that all
legal punishments are retributive or more broadly,
that all punitive penal policies are necessarily re-
tributive; 2° but, just as surely, he does not answer
the question by offering an explicit, ostensibly
complete definition. Following tradition, his con-
ceptualization of retribution is vague and discur-
sive; and in an even more recent defense of the




Thus, critics of the retributive doctrine have no
choice but to formulate their own definition of
retribution, and in this case it is: The legal punish-
ment of an individual, with the punishment pre-
scribed by law solely for the reason that those on
whom it is to be inflicted deserve it. This definition
touches on some considerations that should be
made explicit. The foremost consideration is that
while retributivists rightly emphasize the necessity
for punishments to be prescribed and administered
in accordance with law, that emphasis does not
truly distinguish them from advocates of other
doctrines. Specifically, granted that in attempting
to further deterrence legal officials may be prone
to employ "illegal" practices, the deterrence doc-
trine in itself is not a rejection of principles of
legality. Hence, the distinctive character of the
retributive doctrine reduces to the statement that
criminals should be legally punished only because
they deserve it. That statement does not distort the
retributive doctrine, 2 but it does suggest the doc-
20 That is all the more the case since van den Haag
argues for a penal policy based on both the retributive
doctrine and the deterrence doctrine. For that reason
alone, a careful and systematic conceptualization of re-
tribution is needed to distinguish it from deterrence.
21 G. NEWMAN, supra note 2. The conceptual problem
is manifested in Von Hirsch's abandonment of the term
"retribution," even though making what appears to be
the conventional arguments for a retributive penal policy
(at least as regards incarceration), A. VON HIRSCH, supra
note 2, at 45.
2 The statement is consistent with all manner of state-
ments by Newman, van den Haag, and Von Hirsch.
Moreover, it will not do to describe the retributive doc-
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trine's fundamental shortcoming. Briefly, once a
retributivist has made that statement, he or she
really has nothing more to say. While brevity is all
too rare in the history of ideas, the brevity of the
retributivists' argument precludes answers to ques-
tions that must be answered if a complete penal
policy is to be realized.
What is the appropriate punishment for a given type of
crime?
Assuming that criminals should be punished
because they deserve it (and perhaps for that reason
alone), the retributive doctrine does not specify the
appropriate punishment for all types of crime. It
would be grossly unrealistic to demand such spec-
ificity from any penal doctrine. However, a doc-
trine is not a complete basis for a punitive penal
policy unless it at least implies an answer to this
question: For the type of crime under considera-
tion, what is the appropriate punishment? Unless
one is willing to accept "whatever is a just desert,"
the retributive doctrine implies no answer.
This point takes on special significance in con-
sidering the apparent willingness of American ju-
rists to accept retribution as a sufficient justifica-
tion for the death penalty. They should be con-
fronted with the question: What are the premises
of the retributive doctrine and rules of logic by
which those premises imply that execution is the
appropriate punishment for first-degree murder?
The conventional response of the retributivists-
lex talionis-is far less compelling than it appears.
Executing a convicted murderer may appear to be
entirely consistent with the principle of an-eye-for-
an-eye, but lex talionis is not really a premise in the
retributive doctrine because the doctrine is not
limited to murder. When an attempt is made to
apply the lex talionis principle to the range of crimes
in Anglo-American jurisdictions, the limitations of
the principle becomes obvious. Any doubts as to
those limitations should be resolved by contem-
plating what punishment would suit treason, smok-
ing marijuana, speeding, and homosexual acts.
Contemporary retributivists come no closer to a
defensible answer than did Kant, who recognized
trine as incorporating ajustification of legal punishment
beyond "dessert." To be sure, retributivists are preoccu-
pied with attempting to explain why "criminals should
be punished because they deserve it;" but as Fingarette's
survey clearly shows (H. Fingarette, supra note 6), retri-
butivists have offered all manner of justifications. Hence,
there is no indisputable basis for stating the doctrine ;-i
such a way that it comprises a particular justification of
punishment beyond the notion of dessert.
the problem but offered no more in the way of a
solution than his illustrations of castration for rape
and pederasty and "expulsion from civil society"
for bestiality.23 The illustration itself is puzzling,
and it surely does not give rise to a general princi-
ple. So lex talionis is little more than an ad hoc
justification of the death penalty.'
Contemporary retributivists are prone to admit
that the retributive doctrine does not speak effec-
tively to the question of "appropriate punish-
ments.' ' ss Ernest van den Haag, for example, goes
so far as to point out that even Hegel was at a loss
to provide an answer.26 Such candor is admirable,
but it admits far too much. Indeed, once penal
policy abandons the rehabilitative ideal, nothing,
other than legality itself, is more important than
criteria to determine appropriate punishments for
particular crimes.
Seriousness of crimes
While contemporary retributivists understanda-
bly avoid pretending that their doctrine identifids
appropriate punishments for particular crimes,
they have set'forth principles for such identifica-
tion. The most common principle is that the pun-
ishment should be such that the pain or suffering
inflicted by it is in keeping with the gravity of the
offense.27 The key term, gravity, is troublesome
because retributivists persist in using it as though"
it denotes some objective, obvious property of a
crime. Even so, the present wording of the principle
is surely less ambiguous than other phrases that
retributivists commonly employ, such as making
the punishment "fit the crime" or "resemble the
offenses both in quality and quantity."' A far
more empirically applicable criterion reduces to
the formula that the severity of legal punishment
23 I. KAtrr, THE PHILOSPHY OF LAW 243-44 (W. Has-
tie trans. 1887). Contemporary retributivists evidently
have abandoned such attempts to make the punishment
"fit the crime." For example, van den Haag makes
reference to lex talionis but only to say: "Punishments dc
not and cannot match in kind the crime for which the)
are inflicted." E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 2, at 193.
24 At the same time, however, it is difficult to imagine
any version of the retributive doctrine that would be an
effective argument against the death penalty. The point
is that capital punishment will be a major issue as long
as the retributive doctrine commands a following. By
contrast, it is conceivable that advocates of the deterrence
doctrine will be driven to abandoning the death penalty
in the face of evidence that its application is most uncer-
tain.
2 See note 2 supra.2 6 E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 2, at 194.
27 See note 2 supra.
2 G. NEWMAN, supra note 2, at 198.
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for a crime should be proportionate to the serious-
ness of the crime. However, the term "seriousness"
suggests (erroneously) an objective property of a
crime, and hence it would perhaps be better to
speak of the "extent of social (public) disapproval
of the crime." Yet, "seriousness" appears to be
more conventional, and an appeal to public opin-
ion poses an horrendous problem for anyone, retri-
butivist or otherwise, who is genuinely concerned
with legality.
Needless to say, the foregoing gives rise to a
question of how the seriousness of a crime is to be
judged. One answer hinges on the assumption that
legislators, jurists, or scientists can somehow make
such judgments by objective criteria. It is true that
crimes can be distinguished in terms of at least
some typologies. Thus, no one is likely to deny that
agreement can be realized as to whether a partic-
ular crime resulted in or involved (1) a physical
injury to a victim, (2) loss of money or property by
a victim, or (3) deception. Yet it would be difficult
to extend that list, and without extension it would
be impossible to distinguish among various types
of crimes, especially among crimes without victims.
It is doubtful that purely qualitative distinctions
would suffice, but quantitative distinctions, such
as the extent of physical injury or mental anguish,
are difficult to judge. In any case, the whole enter-
prise of assessing the seriousness of crimes is a study
in quantitative distinctions, for it is inconceivable
that all relevant features of a crime (e.g., those
having to do with harm and culpability) can be
assigned the same "weight." These difficulties are
compounded by recognition that the assessment of
particular crimes and the assessment of types of
crimes cannot be equated. In either case, the ulti-
mate problem is the inevitability of subjectivity.
Even if jurists, legislators, or criminologists should
realize absolute agreement in their assessments of
the seriousness of crimes (particular instances and/
or types), they will have nonetheless surely ignored
several properties and given more weight to some
properties than others. Hence there is a crucial
question: Whose standards are decisive in assessing
seriousness? The question is all the more important
because there is scarcely a basis for assuming no
divergence in the criteria ofjurists, legislators. crim-
inologists, laymen, and particular divisions of the
lay public (e.g., blacks and whites in the United
States).29 If there is substantial divergence, then the
2 The argument may appear to be inconsistent with
reports of substantial agreement among various divisions
of the United States population in the assignment of
"'seriousness" values to types of criminal or delinquent
acts. See generally Symposium on the Aeasurenent of Dehm-
political implications of criminal law are accen-
tuated all the m'ore. Far from speaking to the issue,
statements of the retributive doctrine commonly
create the impression that criminal law is somehow
apolitical. To be sure, retributivists are sophisti-
cated people, and hence their writing commonly
bristles with references to Plato, Hobbes, Rousseau,
and Locke. Their recognition of the political char-
acter of criminal law, however, stops short of mun-
dane considerations. One such consideration is that
time and again American legislatures have created
capital crimes without the presence of one repre-
sentative of a large black population, which is all
the more significant since blacks are overrepre-
sented on death row.
The severity of punishments
Even if the seriousness of crimes could bejudged
in terms of objective criteria, and even if there were
consensus as to the relevance and appropriate
weight of each such criteria, it is pointless to assume
that the severiy of legal punishments can bejudged
objectively. For example, while the presumptive
severity (magnitude) of ten years of imprisonment
is twice that of five years, there is no basis for
assuming that the public perceives relative severity
in terms of such ratios.
When it comes to what are qualitatively different
punishments, presumptive severity is truly a mean-
ingless notion. That is especially obvious when
neither of two types of punishment can be de-
scribed in terms of any metric. Such is the case in
contemplating execution and life imprisonment,
the two principal contenders in the case of what
have been capital crimes in the past.
Public opinion
The only solution of the foregoing problems is to
accept the idea that the seriousness of crimes and
the severity of punishments can be judged only
subjectively in terms of perceived seriousness and
perceived severity. That idea is all the more feasible
since during recent years there has been consider-
able progress in the social and behavioral sciences
toward perfection of techniques for the numerical
expression of perceived magnitudes.
Yet retributivists have not seen fit to restate their
doctrine in terms of perceived severity and per-
quenc', 66J. CR IM. L. & C. 173 (1975). However, the fact
that two individuals assign the same value to a particular
type of criminal or delinquent act is not proof that they
employ the same criteria in judging seriousness. For that
matter, the substantial agreement reported is proportionate
agreement (i.e., correlation) and not anything approach-
ing identical values (i.e., absolute agreement).
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ceived seriousness. As a case in point, van den
Haag is aware of recent attempts to express the
seriousness of crimes by reference to the judgment
of members of the public, but he seems to reject
that procedure."o Yet, he does not propose an al-
ternative procedure, nor does he acknowledge that
identifying the appropriate punishment for a type
of crime in accordance with some formula would
require not only a perceived seriousness value for
the crime, but also a perceived severity value for
each of various types of punishments.
Most importantly, even if all such perceptual
values are absolutely precise, there is no obvious
basis for deducing the appropriate perceived severity
value of the punishment from the perceived seri--
ousness value. To illustrate, a sample of Tucson
residents were asked a question something like this:
"If 100 represents how much you disapprove of
petty theft, what number would you give to rep-
resent your disapproval of first-degree murder?",
31
The median value of the responses is 1,000. Then
another sample of Tucson -residents were asked a
question something like this: "If 100 represents the
severity of one year in the county jail, what number
would you give to represent the severity of the
death penalty?" The median of the responses is
10,000. Hence, by what rules of logic can one
deduce from these findings that the death penalty
is the appropriate punishment for first-degree mur-
der? Nothing is gained by arguing that the value
for murder and the value for the death penalty are
not comparable. Even so, that argument only gives
rise to a difficult problem of how perceived seri-
ousness values and perceived severity values may
be made comparable and hence potentially equat-
able. Advocates of the retributive doctrine simply
do not speak to such problems; but, until they do,
no particular implications follow from what ap-
pears to be a retributive principle-that the sever-
ity of the punishment should be proportionate to
the seriousness of the crime.
The only obvious alternative to a purely legis-
lative determination of legal punishments on an ad
hoc basis is to solicit public opinion of the appro-
priate punishment for a particular crime. Protag-
0 E. VAN DEN HAAG, supra note 2, at 192-93. By
contrast, Von Hirsch evidently accepts the idea of equat-
ing the seriousness of crimes and the severity of penalties
in accordance with some formula; but he says nothing
specific as to how seriousness values are to be computed,
and also as to how the two kinds of values are to be
equated. Newman largely ignores the problem.
31 This research was conducted by Maynard Erickson,
Jack Gibbs and Gary Jensen. Space limitations preclude
a description of the procedure and the sample.
onists in the debate over the death penalty have
appealed to public opinion polls on the subject,
but the findings of those polls have proven to be
most controversial. For one thing, the exact word-
ing of an attitudinal question about capital pun-
ishment is crucial, but it is by no means obvious
what that wording should be. Surely one can doubt
the significance of any response, be it affirmative
or negative, to such a question as: "Do you favor
the death penalty?" The question does not stipulate
any particular type of crime, and even that stipu-
lation would not insure an informed opinion on the
part of respondents, not even as to prospective
instances of the designated type of crime.3 2 For
example, if the type of crime is designated as first-
degree murder, should the respondents be informed
as to whether or not that type encompasses eutha-
nasia, infanticide, and felony murders? Clarifica-
tion of such legal terminology would surely influ-
ence the percentage of respondents who endorse
the death penalty. The same is true when it comes
to information on the administration of the death
penalty (e.g., the certainty of its application) or the
identity of the perpetrator and the victim (e.g., age,
sex).
The problem in assessing public support of the
death penalty is not purely technical. This is be-
cause the legal relevance of public opinion about
criminal sanctions is disputable, and the retributive
doctrine offers nothing whatever to resolve that
dispute. The major term in that doctrine, "just
desert," suggests that criminals should not be pun-
ished capriciously. Yet the retributivists fail to
stipulate who is to determine the just desert for a
particular type of crime, and there are all manner
of reasons for not appealing to public opinion, as
it would give rise to some horrendous issues.
Most obvious among these issues is the improb-
ability of consensus in public opinion as to the
appropriate punishment for any type of crime.
Thus, defenders of the death penalty have tried to
make much of the fact that over receqt years the
majority of respondents in American public opin-
ion polls have endorsed the death penalty. How-
ever, the majority commonly has been far less than
two-thirds,3 and opponents of the death penalty
a' For a treatment of the importance of the "informed
opinion argument," see Sarat & Vidmar, Public Opinion,
The Death Penalty, and The Eighth Amendment: Testing the
Marshall Hypothesis in H. BEDAU & C. PIERCE, CAPITAL.
PUNiSHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 190 (1976).
'1 Erskine, The Polls: Capital Punishment 34 Pt'B. OIIN.
ION Q. 290 (1970): Vidmar & Ellsworth, Pubhc Opinion




could argue that capital punishment is not justified
unless it is acceptable to the overwhelming major-
ity. Indeed, a stringent criterion of "overwhelming"
support has an advantage that is seldom recognized
in that it promotes confidence that informed indi-
viduals do not oppose executions.
Determination of effective consensus is not the
only issue. Additionally, one must confront the
distinction between "structural" consensus and
"individual" consensus. That distinction can be
illustrated by considering the outcome of an opin-
ion poll in which, say, seventy-five percent of the
respondents voiced support of the death penalty.
Now suppose that the percentage of those endors-
ing the death penalty varies enormously from one
ethnic, racial, or occupational division of the pop-
ulation to the next, with overwhelming opposition
to the death penalty voiced in some of those divi-
sions. Surely such structural dissensus cannot be dis-
missed as irrelevant, but just as surely there is no
accepted principle that would resolve the issue.
Moreover, the possibility of individual consensus
but structural dissensus is not just a theoretical
possibility. Public opinion polls in the United
States clearly indicate much more support for the
death penalty in some social divisions of the pop-
ulation than in others, and the contrasts along
racial lines are quite large.34
The most controversial issue has to do with the
proper functions of criminal law. A host of distin-
guished figures in the history of legal philosophy
have argued that one essential function is protec-
tion of those accused of a crime from the uncon-
trolled passions of the public for vengeance. Ordi-
narily, one thinks of those passions as prompting
the citizenry to "take the law into their own
hands," but allowing public opinion to dictate
statutory penalties or judicial rulings is not an
altogether different matter. If nothing else, there is
ample evidence that statutory penalties would have
to be altered frequently to be consistent with trends
in public opinion. Figures from opinion polls con-
cerning the death penalty suggest considerable
short-run fluctuation in that support,3s and no
accepted principle of legality can be reconciled
with the prospects of allowing the fate of a con-
victed murderer to be determined by the impact of
the most recent opinion poll. The point is not that
the retributive doctrine calls for "justice through
public opinion polls". Rather, retributivists side-
34 id.
35 Id.
step the issue by leaving "just desert" as an essen-
tially metaphysical notion.
Discretion
In American jurisdictions there is a definite trend
toward the reduction of discretion in all stages of
the enforcement of criminal law, and that trend is
conspicuous in recent opinions of the United States
Supreme Court on the death penalty.36 The rulings
of the Court are clearly in the direction of rejecting
absolutely mandatory death sentences but at the
same time imposing rigorous controls on proce-
dures in sentencing and precluding unlimited dis-
cretion. What the Court appears to be calling for
is something akin to the statutory recognition of
mitigating and aggravating circumstances. There
is no doubt that some relevant circumstances can
be described in objective terms (e.g., whether the
murder victim was a prison guard acting in the
line of duty); hence, a statutory designation of
them may be feasible. However, the kinds of cir-
cumstances that courts will accept as reasonable
and justifiable remain to be seen, and the retribu-
tive doctrine scarcely speaks to the question. For
that matter, insofar as advocates of the doctrine
speak to the issue of discretion at all, they appear
badly divided.37
The dissensus among retrilbutivists with regard
to discretion is puzzling, because once it is accepted
that the severity of punishment should be propor-
tionate to the seriousness of the offense, there is
nothing that precludes considerable discretion by
a judge or jury in sentencing. To be sure, the
statutory prescription of a mandatory, definite sen-
tence may appear to insure equity in punishment
and hence be more consistent with the retributive
doctrine. Yet, statutory penalties are prescribed for
particular types of crimes (e.g., first-degree murder,
aggravated assault, burglary), and it would be
ludicrous to assume that all instances of any type
of crime are equally serious or heinous. Hence, if
36 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v.
Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Fur-
man v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
37 Some contemporary retributivists, e.g. G. NEWMAN,
supra note 2, at 200, admit the dissensus on the subject of
discretion. However, the dissensus among contemporary
retributivists is not limited to discretion in sentencing;
they also differ (inter alia) as to whether the statutory
penalty for a type of crime should be less severe on a first




the severity of punishment is to be proportionate
to the seriousness of the offense, alternative statu-
tory penalites (e.g., no less than two years imprison-
ment nor more than five years and/or a fine of not
less than $20,000 nor more than $100,000) appear
the only way by which that principle can be ap-
plied in particular instances.
The point is that alternative statutory penalties
(including indefinite or indeterminate prison sen-
tences) are no more consistent with a rehabilitative
penal policy than a retributive penal policy. Those
penalties would serve a purely retributive function
only if magistrates were instructed by the criminal
code to judge the seriousness of each offense and to
select the sentence within the stipulated statutory
range of possibilities such, that its severity is pro-
portionate to the seriousness of the offense.sm In the
case of a prospective capital sentence, the judge or
the jury can choose between imprisonment and
death by reference to circumstances that make the
offense more or less heinous. As already indicated,
the trend in the rulings of the United States Su-
preme Court is in the direction of a statutory
stipulation of relevant circumstances,a9 but it re-
mains to be seen (by a retrospective case-by-case
analysis) whether the relevant circumstances can
be reduced to statutory prescriptions.
The foregoing argument stops short of alleging
that the retributive doctrine requires or tacitly
endorses discretion in sentencing. Yet it is not clear
that the retributive doctrine calls for a mandatory,
definite statutory penalty for each type of crime.
The ambiguity simply reflects the fact that com-
temporary retributivists cease to speak in unison
when confronted with specific questions about le-
gal punishments.
CONCLUSION
Although jurists, legislators, laymen and scholars
appear to be increasingly inclined to accept the
retributive doctrine over either the rehabilitative
or deterrence doctrines, they have done so without
recognizing that the retributive doctrine really does
'8 Yet the sentence in each particular case would have
to be definite (e.g., 10 years' imprisonment) rather than
indehnite (e.g., not less than two years); otherwise, a
"retributive" sentence would not be distinguishable from
those preferred by advocates of rehabilitation.
39 See note 36 supra.
not resolve a host of issues in penal policy.4 0 Those
issues reduce to the following questions: How are
the seriousness of offenses and the severity of pun-
ishments to be judged? Who is to make such judg-
ments? In what way if any is public opinion rele-
vant in justifying punishments? Finally, should
discretion in sentencing be eliminated?
Those issues have been analyzed here largely in
connection with the death penalty and murder,
but they are no less salient for other types of
punishment or other types of crime. Indeed, the
issues expand when contemplating noncapital
crimes. As a case in point, no one is likely to
entertain the idea that restitution is appropriate
for murder, but whether or not restitution is ap-
propriate for other crimes is an issue. It may appear
that there is nothing in the retributivists' state-
ments about ' Just desert" that would preclude
restitution as a criminal sanction, but such a pun-
ishment is hardly an end in itself.
To conclude, Justice Marshall notwithstanding,
the fundamental shortcoming of the retributive
doctrine is not that it seeks to justify a legal pun-
ishment as ari end in itself; rather, the doctrine
offers no solutions to the specific problems that
haunt the criminal justice system. Putting the crit-
icism more bluntly, the retributive doctrine is at-
tractive precisely because it is little more than an
empty formula. That characterization is not a tacit
belittlement of the perennial efforts ofretributivists
to justify legal punishments. Nonetheless, the jus-
tification of legal punishments in general is not a
justification of the death penalty, let alone a penal
policy.
'o Needless to say, neither the deterrence doctrine nor
the rehabilitative doctrine provides an answer to all
important questions touching on penal policy (far from
it); but that recognition hardly eliminates the defects of
the retributive doctrine. For that matter, advocates of the
rehabilitative doctrine appear to be much more unified
when it comes to endorsement of discretion in sentencing.
As for advocates of the deterrence doctrine, they can at
least argue that the appropriate statutory penalty for a
particular type of crime can be treated as a scientific
question. By contrast, empirical findings would aid retri-
butivists in their attempts to identify appropriate penal-
ties only if retributivists grant the relevance of public
opinion in the determination of criminal sanctions. Even
so, it is difficult to imagine any empirical finding that
would promote consensus among retributivists as to dis-
cretion in sentencing and the relevance of previous con-
victions in setting statutory penalties.
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